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Why Iran cannot simply surrender

By Eric Garland 
Real Clear Wire

Observers might wonder why the Islamic Republic of Iran has not yet folded. Perhaps the remaining senior leaders were hoping for a shift coming from the U.S. and Israeli elections, but their situation has been dire. Iran’s air force and navy have been laid low. Much of its leadership was eliminated by air strikes. 

The U.S. Navy has reduced its oil at sea to zero and the U.S. Treasury has cut off its finances around the world. History tells us that most regimes in their position would surrender. Generally, surrender requires force majeure. France in 1940, Italy in 1943, Germany in 1945, Japan in 1945—all of those surrenders required invasion, occupation, or nuclear detonations. Russia and the Ottomans in 1918, Iraq in 2003, and Libya in 2011, all of them required the loss of territory from boots on the ground before striking a deal. Only one, though, has capitulated from bombs alone, Serbia in 1999.

So what should analysts make of Iran? While not inclined to put infantry on Iranian soil, the U.S. could easily continue crushing air strikes. And yet the Iranian regime continues to actually threaten its adversaries with reprisals. How could this continue to look like a David-and-Goliath story? Is Iran somehow more resilient than the Ottomans, Germans, and Japanese facing similar odds?

In considering the answer, analysts might run afoul of a category error. Iran is not, in a realpolitik sense, just a country. It is the central node in a transnational network that deals in oil, military technology, weapons components, and hired violence around the world. China buys its sanctioned oil and in return provides hardware for its drone business. 

Russia is both a customer to Iran and a partner for military hardware. The geographic network for all of the businesses, from crude oil to assassinations, can be uncomfortable to discuss because most of the countries involved are partners of the United States; one is a member of NATO.

Therein lies the wicked problem of defeating Iran. This is not a question of neutralizing a single country’s military capabilities and decapitating its government. To defeat Iran, the U.S. government must destroy the latent network that comprises the country’s enduring capabilities and true threat. More can be done, though, from designating Hong Kong banks to prosecuting the espionage and criminal networks so that Iran is no longer a threat to the United States, its neighbors, or the world.

Facing a Global Network Threat
Iran’s threat cannot be perceived by simply looking at Tehran, Isfahan, and Kharg Island. The Iranian network goes from the Persian Gulf to Shandong and Dalian, China, which receive their sanctioned oil. The money goes to Dubai and Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, which settle their accounts. The shell companies are based out of Hong Kong. Istanbul banks them, too. 

Bogus paperwork is provided out of Basra, Iraq, so their oil can make it to more markets, marked as “Iraqi” crude. Alabuga, Tatarstan, Russia is where the drones are made, and the waters off Johor, Malaysia is where their crude is swapped out into non-sanctioned tankers. Muscat, Oman is where they get access to Yemen. And their violence is shipped to Stockholm, Brooklyn, Sydney, and Maryland — not to mention their proxies such as Hizballah.

There is no official statistic for this illicit economy, but a working estimate can be produced from open sources. The crude oil makes up the bulk of the money, an estimated $45 billion a year before the blockade, almost all of it going to China. The U.S. Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) found an additional $9 billion in Iranian shadow banking in 2024 moving through shell companies in the Emirates, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Russia’s Shahed drone contract, according to leaked emails, was $1.75 billion total. Topped off with fuel smuggling and cryptocurrency, Iran’s illicit network has total revenue of around $50 billion a year, close to 10 percent of its entire economy.

Two things change hands in this network: money, which mostly moves not between governments but through individuals and companies who serve Tehran and who also have a profit motive, and alignment, because anyone who does business with people who lead chants of “Death to America” is, at minimum, comfortable with a world that has less America in it. That could be why bombing buildings in Tehran has produced no white flag, because individuals have multiple reasons to want to keep the malign network operational. 

Moreover, Iran’s real operational capability against Western countries has been through its terrorism, malign influence, and murder-for-hire networks, and the bombing has not reduced the overseas layers of the networks to the same degree. If Tehran perceives those networks as weapons and ammunition they can still use to fight, then the United States should take them away. Psychologically and practically, the remaining regime in Tehran may be delaying renewed negotiation on the cessation of hostilities until it perceives that it has no more ability to strike back at its enemies. The United States should hurry them along on that journey by destroying their overseas networks.

Fighting a Conventional and Network War at the Same Time
Iran is thus a hybrid threat, both a country with a traditional armed forces, intelligence apparatus, and government, and one with a global illicit partner network. The United States has started by bombing the first part and has now transitioned to the second.

On Feb. 28, 2026, the United States and Israel commenced Operation Epic Fury with conventional airstrikes. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in the first salvo, along with the commander of the Revolutionary Guard and the Armed Forces chief of staff. By the 16th day, Central Command reported more than 100 Iranian naval vessels destroyed, and the White House had declared that the Iranian air force was no more. It was, by any measure, a decapitation and significant degradation of Iran’s conventional military capabilities. Thus began the longer phase of blockades, seizure of oil tankers at sea, and brokered ceasefire negotiations.

That is where U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s war began in earnest. On Aug. 24, he announced Operation Economic Outcast. His words are unequivocal: “any entity that facilitates money laundering on behalf of Iran will be removed from the U.S. dollar system.” They are moving fast and imposing cost. On Aug. 28, the Treasury moved to cut Banque Misr’s Emirati subsidiary off from American correspondent banking. On Oct. 8, it designated 17 tankers under 12 flags, owned through companies in the Marshall Islands, China, Hong Kong, the British Virgin Islands, and the United Kingdom.

The few hundred companies that do the network’s real work are concentrated in six places: the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Hong Kong, Iraq, Oman, and Malaysia. Two of the six have already dramatically changed their behavior. Iran convinced the Emirates to choose a new path in a way the U.S. Treasury never could have. After Iranian missiles struck two Abu Dhabi National Oil Company tankers on Aug. 8 and 14, the Emirati Foreign Ministry announced that “all trade, commercial exchanges, and financial transactions with Iran” were “halted until further notice.”  

The Emiratis have closed the front door, and Treasury’s action against Banque Misr starts to take care of the back door, too.

Turkey has quietly changed its behavior as well. In June, Halkbank, the Turkish state bank indicted in 2019 for an earlier gold-for-oil scheme, was allowed to walk away with a deferred prosecution agreement, no fine, and no admission of wrongdoing. In September, Golden Global Bank was removed from the dollar system. On Sept. 19, 2026, Turkey revoked Bank Mellat’s Istanbul license, and they halted Iran’s Mahan Air flights.

A skeptic might read the behavior of Abu Dhabi and Ankara and conclude that it is the blockade and not the Treasury actions that keep Iranian crude from reaching China — that Treasury is just adding a bureaucratic explanation of a reality that was changed through brute military force. Force and finance are not competing explanations, but complementary. A network participant looking at transacting business with Iran has to calculate two major factors: whether the cargo will arrive at all, and whether all its bank accounts will be shut down if it gets caught. Both of those factors are under crushing pressure from the U.S. government right now. The Treasury sanctions have been a risk for years, but this is the first time the U.S. Navy got involved and announced it would be boarding ships carrying Iranian crude wherever they are in the world. Military force appears to compound the effectiveness of financial sanctions.

A Finish Line for Iran Policy
There is little question that the current policy is succeeding in reducing the threat from Iran. It cannot defend itself in a conventional war, its nuclear program has been decimated, and it cannot fund its proxies. And yet it does not surrender.

For those hoping for a Serbian outcome as in 1999, they need to review how the capitulation was achieved from airstrikes alone. Slobodan Milošević had a single patron: Russia. As soon as Chernomyrdin flew in with a Western negotiator, it was over. Iran has two countries, Russia and China, which act more like anchors. Both are structural for Iran, but neither controls it. As such, nobody else will surrender on the mullahs’ behalf. Serbia was the client of a large, regional patron that could call the shots. Iran is closer to a crime family run by religious mob bosses.

To neutralize the threat, Iran’s network must be dismantled, node by node, by the United States and its allies. This will require decisive action, but one that will have major consequences. It is interesting to note which country has, so far, been least impacted by sanctions that should otherwise bite them hard. Hong Kong is not named in Treasury’s Oct. 5 notice to banks at all — and Hong Kong originated 49 percent of the Iranian shadow banking identified by FinCEN in 2024. Of the two anchors, China is the one most sensitive to American financial weapons because its banks still need the dollar system for nearly everything. This is the final frontier for Operation Economic Outcast. If Treasury designates a major Chinese bank or names the Hong Kong formation agents whose shells carry a significant percentage of Iran’s oil trade, then they mean business. If not, then the world will know America’s limits.

What’s more, the U.S. should prosecute more of Iran’s agents around the world using the recent cases as a template. The prosecution of Iran’s malign activities is already underway, but must be expanded to further reduce its threat to the rest of the world. Law enforcement is a critical weapon because Iran’s hired-violence operations are not as sensitive to sanctions as its oil smuggling.

A country’s surrender is different from a network’s, but the latter is not impossible. The Department of Defense did the loud part of its job in the first 16 days, and its job is not finished. The Treasury Department has only been engaged in its most intense fighting for a couple of months. In some ways the work cannot be rushed, and the effort should be sustained. The loss of their air force and navy did not demoralize the regime, perhaps because those weren’t Iran’s main weapons. The regime attacked the West through proxies, terrorist groups, hired violence, and propaganda.

The continued existence of the networks that comprised those weapons may be what is giving Iran the will to fight despite overwhelming force from the United States on its doorstep. If those are the psychological foundations of the regime’s confidence, then the United States should destroy those with the same relentless destructive power as was brought against Iran’s navy and air force. The result must be to defang and demoralize the regime so that they can never pose the same threat to the world.

Eric Garland is a strategic intelligence analyst and the principal of Competitive Futures, publisher of the Systemics Quarterly Brief, which has provided strategic intelligence and foresight to corporate and government clients since 2002. He was sanctioned by the Russian Federation in 2022 for his expertise in foreign interference and intelligence operations.

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