The war that was always coming

By Mike Lyons
Real Clear Wire

The recent Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear infrastructure did not emerge from a vacuum. It represents the culmination of a decades-long military doctrine, grounded in strategic inevitability and sharpened by years of intelligence operations and targeted disruption. For those who have tracked Iran’s nuclear ambitions, this moment was not a surprise; it was inevitable.

Israel has confronted this scenario before. In 1981, under Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Israeli aircraft executed a preemptive strike against Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. The message was unequivocal - no hostile regime in the region would be permitted to acquire a nuclear weapon. That policy became known as the Begin Doctrine: a unilateral strategy to neutralize existential threats before they could materialize.

Syria received the same message in 2007 when Israel destroyed a covert nuclear reactor in Deir ez-Zor, constructed with North Korean assistance. Over the past two decades, Israel has viewed Iran’s nuclear ambitions through the same lens. Tehran, however, proved a more capable and sophisticated adversary. Iranian leadership studied the lessons of Iraq and Syria and adapted accordingly. Their nuclear program was dispersed, fortified underground, and shielded by air defenses and a robust proxy network. The goal was to render the program immune to a single, decisive strike.

Despite these challenges, Israel remained vigilant. When kinetic options were unavailable, Israeli intelligence services turned to sabotage. In 2010, the Stuxnet cyberattack, which was widely believed to be a joint Israeli-American operation, successfully disrupted thousands of Iranian centrifuges. Mossad operations eliminated key Iranian nuclear scientists. In recent years, Israeli efforts across Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon have systematically degraded Iran’s proxy architecture, targeting Hezbollah, the Houthis, and various Shia militias. This broader conflict has been unfolding in parallel for years. The recent escalation marks merely the visible phase.

The events of October 7 marked a turning point. Although initially caught off guard, Israel responded with comprehensive force. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated unequivocally, "There is a time for peace and a time for war." Israel has remained on a war footing ever since. The precision and scale of the strike on Iran suggest long-term planning. This was not reactionary. It was a strategic execution, calibrated and deliberate. The intent is not deterrence alone, but the achievement of permanent outcomes.

Much like Operation Desert Storm, where the stated objective was the liberation of Kuwait, Israel's campaign may carry unspoken but widely understood implications. In 1991, the U.S. military mission officially stopped short of toppling Saddam Hussein, but few doubted that regime collapse would have been viewed as an acceptable or even desirable consequence. Similarly, while Israel’s explicit aim is to dismantle Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, a secondary effect, whether intended or not, could be the political unraveling of the Islamic Republic itself. That possibility is increasingly plausible as strikes continue.

Much like the United States during Operation Desert Storm, Israel’s objectives extend beyond battlefield metrics. The elimination of Iran’s nuclear capability may be the central goal, but additional effects, such as degrading the IRGC command structure, unraveling Iran's regional influence, and accelerating diplomatic realignments are already taking shape. Some of these outcomes may have been unintended, but all will carry long-term strategic consequences.

For the United States, this moment presents not only a challenge but an opportunity.

For decades, successive U.S. administrations pursued the notion that Iran could be contained, managed, or normalized through engagement. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was, at best, a temporary delay. Iran never relinquished its nuclear aspirations; it merely paused them. That pause has now expired.

The current reality is stark. The proxy infrastructure that once provided Iran with strategic depth has been severely degraded. The deterrence that Iran projected has been largely exposed. For the first time since the 1979 revolution, the United States has an opportunity to help guide the region toward a fundamentally new security architecture.

The United States must seize this opportunity to reshape the region’s security architecture. By leading diplomatic efforts to expand the Abraham Accords and engage Syria, Washington can accelerate Saudi-Israeli normalization and support Lebanon’s reconstruction beyond Hezbollah’s influence. This requires statesmanship, not short-term gestures, to secure American interests for decades to come.

Nevertheless, significant uncertainties remain. Turkey continues to behave as a regional wildcard, oscillating between a NATO partner and disruptive actor. Iraq’s future remains a contested territory, vulnerable to influence from both Tehran and Washington. And while Iran has suffered a serious setback, its regime retains asymmetric capabilities, including cyber warfare and unconventional retaliation.

This is, fundamentally, a military moment. It is not a time for reactive diplomacy or symbolic gestures. Strategic resets are not achieved through communiqués but through precision, strength, and follow-through.

This is also not a challenge that can be resolved solely through airstrikes and force posture. While military planners execute the present campaign, it will take deliberate, high-level diplomacy to shape the post-strike order. The U.S. must begin planning for what comes next - whether that means securing nuclear sites, supporting transitional structures, or deterring adversaries like Russia and China from filling the vacuum. These outcomes will not be secured through tactical victories alone. They require a strategic framework that transcends partisan cycles and speaks to long-term American interests across the region.

At the same time, this moment is too consequential to be left solely in the hands of military planners. While CENTCOM and the Pentagon may manage the operational tempo, a broader, enduring diplomatic strategy is essential to securing U.S. interests in the region for the next generation. The next phase must be shaped by statesmanship, not electoral cycles, but principles and objectives that will carry American influence deep into the second half of the 21st century.

The central question facing Washington is this: will the United States rise to meet this moment, or will it repeat the familiar pattern of disengagement and delay? The battlefield has changed. Our strategy must evolve accordingly.